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Abstract
Mertens, Neyman and Rosenberg [6] used the Mertens and Neyman theorem [5] to prove
the existence of uniform value for absorbing games with finite state space and compact action
sets. We provide an analogous proof for another class of stochastic games, recursive games
with finite state space and compact action sets. Moreover, both players have stationary
ε-optimal strategies.
Keywords: Stochastic games; Recursive games; Value; Long-term analysis
OR/MS Subject Classification. Primary: games-group decisions/stochastic
1 Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [9], and the model Γ = 〈K, I, J, g, q〉
is as follows: K is the finite state space, I (resp. J) is the finite action set for player 1
(resp. player 2), g : K × I × J → R is the stage payoff function and q : K × I × J →
∆(K) is the probability transition function (∆(K) stands for the set of probabilities on
K). k1 ∈ K is the initial state. At each stage t ≥ 1, after observing the t-stage history
ht = (k1, i1, j1, ..., kt−1, it−1, jt−1, kt), player 1 chooses an action it ∈ I and player 2 chooses
an action jt ∈ J . This profile (it, jt) induces a current stage payoff gt := g(kt, it, jt) and
transition probability q(kt, it, jt) for kt+1 the state at the next stage.
We write σ ∈ Σ for a behavior strategy for player 1, resp. τ ∈ T for player 2. The
λ-discounted value vλ of the stochastic game Γ (for λ ∈ (0, 1]) is defined with respect to the
payoff γλ(k1, σ, τ) = E
k1
σ,τ
[∑
t≥1 λ(1 − λ)
t−1g(it, jt, kt)
]
. The n-stage value vn (for n ≥ 1) is
defined analogously by taking the n-stage averaged payoff. Shapley [9] proved that
vλ = Φ(λ, vλ), with (1.1)
∀f ∈ R|K|, Φ(λ, f)(k) = valx∈∆(I),y∈∆(J)E
k
x,y
[
λg(i, j, k) + (1 − λ)f(k′)
]
, (1.2)
where valx∈∆(I),y∈∆(J) = maxx∈∆(I)miny∈∆(J ) = miny∈∆(J )maxx∈∆(I), and that station-
ary optimal strategies exist for each λ, i.e. depending at each stage t only the current state kt.
Remark. When the action sets I and J are metric compact, one may assume g and q to be
separately continuous on I × J , and this implies the measurability for them (cf. I.1.Ex.7a
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in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [7]). The above description and results extend (cf. VII.1.a
in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [7]): the operator Φ(λ, ·) in Equation (1.2) is well defined, vλ
exists and satisfies Equation (1.1), and both players have stationary optimal strategies for
each λ.
We are interested in long-run properties of Γ: convergence of vλ as λ tends to zero or
convergence of vn as n tends to infinity. Moreover, in case of convergence, we ask for the
existence of ε-optimal strategies for both players which guarantee the limit value in all games
with a sufficiently large horizon n, explicitly:
Definition 1.1 Let v ∈ R|K|. Play 1 can guarantee v in Γ if, for any ε > 0 and for every
k1 ∈ K, there exist N(ε) ∈ N and a behavior strategy σ
∗ ∈ Σ for player 1 s.t.: ∀τ ∈ T ,
(A)
1
n
E
k1
σ∗,τ
[ n∑
t=1
gt
]
≥ v(k1)− ε, ∀n ≥ N(ε),
(B) Ek1σ∗,τ
[
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
gt
]
≥ v(k1)− ε.
A similar definition holds for player 2.
v is the uniform value of Γ if both players can guarantee it.
For stochastic games with finite state space and finite action sets, Bewley and Kohlberg
[?] proved the convergence of vλ as λ tends to zero (and later deduce the convergence of vn as
n tends to infinity), using an algebric argument. Using the property that the function λ 7→ vλ
has bounded variation, that follows from [?], Mertens and Neyman [5] proved the existence
of the uniform value. Actually, Mertens and Neyman’s theorem [5] is even applicable to a
stochastic game Γ with compact action sets under the following form:
Theorem 1.2 (Mertens and Neyman [5]) Let λ → wλ ∈ R
|K| be a function defined on
(0, 1]. Player 1 can guarantee lim supλ→0+ wλ in the stochastic game Γ if wλ satisfies:
i) for some integrable function φ : (0, 1]→ R+, ||wλ − wλ′ ||∞ ≤
∫ λ′
λ
φ(x)dx, ∀0 < λ, λ′ < 1;
ii) for every λ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small, Φ(λ,wλ) ≥ wλ.
Remark. In the construction of ε-optimal strategy in Mertens and Neyman [5], wλ is taken
to be vλ, so condition i) is implied by the bounded variation property of vλ and condition
ii) is implied by Equation (1.1).
An absorbing state is such that once reached, the probability of leaving it is zero. Without
loss of generality one assumes that at any absorbing state, the payoff is absorbing (equal to
the value of the static game to be played after absorption), as long as one states that both
players are informed of the current state.
Γ = 〈K, I, J, g, q〉 is an absorbing game if all states but one are absorbing. Mertens,
Neyman and Rosenberg [6] used the above Theorem 1.2 to prove the existence of uniform
value for absorbing games with finite state space and compact action sets.
Recursive games, introduced by Everett [3], are stochastic games where the stage payoff
is always zero before reaching an absorbing state. This note proves the existence of uniform
value for a recursive game with finite state space and compact action sets, using an approach
analogous to Mertens, Neyman and Rosenberg [6] for absorbing games. Moreover, due to
the specific payoff structure, we show that ε-optimal strategies in recursive games can be
taken stationary. This is not the case for a general stochastic game, in which an ε-optimal
strategy has to be usually a function of the whole past history (cf. Blackwell and Ferguson
[2] for the "Big match" as an example).
Everett [3] proved the existence of stationary ε-optimal strategies for both players which
guarantee the "limiting-average value" (property (B) in Definition 1.1). As our proof relies
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on his characterization of this value (and on its existence), we describe here the result.
Given S ⊆ Rd, let S denote its closure.
Let K0 ⊆ K be the set of nonabsorbing states.
Φ(0, ·) refers to the operator Φ(λ, ·) with λ = 0 in Equation (1.2).
Theorem 1.3 (Everett [3]) Let Γ be a recursive game with finite state space and compact
action sets. Then Γ has a limiting-average value v and both players have stationary ε-
optimal strategy, i.e. ∀ε > 0, there are stationary strategies (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ Σ × T s.t.: for any
(σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T ,
E
k1
σ∗,τ
[
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
gt
]
≥ v(k1)− ε and E
k1
σ,τ∗
[
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
gt
]
≤ v(k1) + ε
Moreover, the limiting-average value v is characterized by1 {v} = ξ+ ∩ ξ−, where
ξ+ =
{
u ∈ R|K
0| : Φ(0, u) ≥ u, and Φ(0, u)(k) > u(k) whenever u(k) > 0
}
,
ξ− =
{
u ∈ R|K
0| : Φ(0, u) ≤ u, and Φ(0, u)(k) < u(k) whenever u(k) < 0
}
.
Everett [3]’s proof of the above result consists of the following two arguments: first, any
vector u ∈ ξ+ (resp. u ∈ ξ−) can be guaranteed by player 1 (resp. player 2); second, the
intersection of ξ+ and ξ− is nonempty.
2 Main results and the proof
We prove that v (as characterized in Theorem 1.3) is also the uniform value of Γ, and that
players have stationary ε-optimal strategies.
Theorem 2.1 A recursive game with finite state space and compact actions sets has a uni-
form value. Moreover, both players can guarantee the uniform value in stationary strategies.
Remark. We emphasize that our definition of uniform value includes that of limiting-average
value, thus our results extend Everett [3] to a much stronger set-up.
Proof. We first prove that v is the uniform value of Γ using Theorem 1.2. Let u be any
vector in ξ+. An equivalent characterization for u is:
Φ(0, u) ≥ u and u(k) ≤ 0 whenever Φ(0, u)(k) = u(k), ∀k ∈ K0.
Define wλ = u, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1). We check that wλ satisfies the two conditions i) & ii) in Theorem
1.2.
i) It is trivial since u does not depend on λ;
ii) The crucial point is that Φ(λ, u) = (1 − λ)Φ(0, u) for recursive games. Then the
condition Φ(λ,wλ) ≥ wλ for all λ close to 0 is satisfied in the following two cases:
• for k ∈ K0 with Φ(0, u)(k) > u(k), we have (1− λ)Φ(0, u)(k) > u(k) for λ close to 0+;
• for k ∈ K0 with Φ(0, u)(k) = u(k), we have u(k) ≤ 0, thus
(1− λ)Φ(0, u)(k) = (1− λ)u(k) ≥ u(k), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
1When working with the operator Φ(0, ·) or Φ(λ, ·), it is sufficient to consider those vectors u ∈ RK identical
to the absorbing payoffs on the absorbing states K \K0. Whenever no confusion is caused, we identify u with its
projection on R|K0|.
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Now Theorem 1.2 states that player 1 can uniformly guarantee any u ∈ ξ+. A symmetric
argument proves that player 2 can uniformly guarantee any vector u ∈ ξ−. As {v} = ξ+∩ξ−
is nonempty by Theorem 1.3, this proves that v is the uniform value of Γ.
Next, we point out that the ε-optimal strategy appearing in the Mertens and Neyman
theorem [5] can be taken stationary when Γ is a recursive game. Indeed, let wλ be the
function satisfying conditions i) & ii) in Theorem 1.2. The general construction of σ for
player 1 to guarantee lim supλ→0+ wλ is as follows: at each stage t ≥ 1,
• step 1. the t-stage history is used to compute in an inductive way a small enough
discount factor λt;
• step 2. play some optimal strategy xλt(wλt , kt) ∈ ∆(I) in the zero-sum game
Φ(λt, wλt)(kt), which is defined in Equation (1.2) by letting f = wλt , λ = λt, k = kt.
Since 1) we have chosen in the first part of the proof wλ = u to be constant, 2)
Φ(λ, u) = (1 − λ)Φ(0, u) for recursive games, this implies that xλt(wλt , kt) can be taken
to be some x(u, kt), an optimal strategy of player 1 in the zero-sum game Φ(0, u)(kt) =
valx∈∆(I),y∈∆(J)E
kt
x,y
[
u(k′)
]
. Hence, to define σ, we do not need (as in Mertens and Ney-
man [5]) the whole t-stage history to compute λt, and the only necessary information is the
current state kt.
3 Concluding remarks
1. To have a better understanding of the existence of stationary ε-optimal strategy
in recursive games, one can compare our construction to the one in Mertens, Neyman and
Rosenberg [6] for absorbing games. Indeed, they have also chosen wλ to be some constant
function u. However, there is no such equality Φ(λ, u) = (1−λ)Φ(0, u) for absorbing games,
so the optimal strategy xλt(wλt , kt) at each stage t for Φ(λt, u) depends on λt, hence on the
whole history.
2. Since the constructed ε-optimal strategy is stationary, our proof extends to recur-
sive games with signals on actions: there is no need to assume perfect observation of the
opponent’s actions, as long as both players are informed of the current state.
3. A weaker notion corresponds to the existence of an asymptotic value, i.e. limn→∞ vn =
limλ→0 vλ = v and was studied in previous works. For absorbing games with finite state space
and compact action sets, Rosenberg and Sorin [8] characterized and proved such existence,
via the so-called operator approach. Using the same approach, Sorin [?] provided the corre-
sponding result for recursive games with finite state space and compact action sets and in
particular, showed that the asymptotic value is equal to the unique vector characterized by
ξ+ ∩ ξ− in Everett [3].
However, these convergence results do not extend to general stochastic games with finite
state space and compact action sets: Vigeral [11] provided an example with no convergence of
vλ. This implies a fortiori that the existence result of a uniform value for absorbing/recursive
games with compact actions does not extend to general stochastic games.
4. Our proof does not extend to recursive games with infinite state space. In fact that
we use the nonemptiness of ξ+ ∩ ξ−, which is obtained in Everett [3] by an inductive proof
on the (finite) number of states.
Li and Venel [4] provided a sufficient condition for recursive games with infinite state space
to have a uniform value, that is, the family of n-stage values {vn} being totally bounded
for the uniform norm. They presented also an example to have no uniform value when this
condition is not satisfied.
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